Abstract-Currently, ID-based public key cryptography has got many useful achievements and attracted much attention. Proxy signature scheme enables an original signer to delegate his\her signing capability to a proxy signer to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. In this paper, we will theoretically discuss on the provable security of an ID-based proxy signature scheme. In fact, we analyze the ID-based proxy signature scheme proposed by Mala et al.'s and show that this scheme is secure in the random oracle model. We show that their scheme's security can be reduced to the hardness of CDHP.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of proxy signature scheme was first introduced by Mambo et al.'s in 1996 [1] . In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer can delegate his\her signing power to a proxy signer and then the proxy signer can create a valid signature on behalf of the original signer. In order to introduce a secure proxy signature, each proxy signature scheme should satisfy these security requirements [2, 3] : Verifiability, Strong Unforgeability, Strong Undeniability, Strong Identifiability and Prevention of misuse.
Although. many proxy signature scheme provide the above requirements, but their security meaning are unclear. Recently, a method has been developed that called Provable-Security [4] . This method has been widely used to support standard. Boldyreva et al. [5] used this theory to help the security analysis of the proxy signature schemes, and provide methods to prove the security of such schemes.
ID-based proxy signature scheme (IBPS Scheme or IBPSS) is a special ID-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). Shamir [6] was first proposed the idea of ID-PKC in 1984. So far, many ID-based proxy signature scheme have been proposed [7, 8] and some of IBPSS have provable security in the random oracle model such as [9] , [10] and [11] .
In this paper, we will analyze the IBPS scheme proposed by Mala et al. [7] . We will show that their scheme can be proven to be secure in the random oracle model and their scheme's security can be reduced to the hardness of CDHP.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the basic definitions. In the section 3, we Setup: Let be a group of prime order introduced by , be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order, and : × → be a bilinear map. PKG chooses a random master key ∈ ℤ * and sets = . Then he\she chooses hash functions:
Then he\she publishes these parameters as the system parameters: Ω = , , , , , , , , , Key Extract: For a given identity , PKG computes = ( ) ∈ and the corresponding private key = ∈ . Sign: For the private key of the original signer , in order to sign the warrant , he\she uses Hess's signature scheme:
1) Chooses ∈ ℤ * at random and computes = ( , ) and = ( , ).
2) Computes
= + ∈ . The signature on is the warrant = 〈 , 〉. Verify: to verify the signature 〈 , 〉 on a message for the identity , the verifier 1) First should computes = ( ) and = ( , )
, . 
Then he\she accepts the signature as a valid proxy signature if and only if the follow equation hold.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
A. Attack Model for an IBS
We consider a polynomial-time adversary . The security model of identity-based proxy signature is defined as follows:
Definition. An IBPS scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message and identity attack (EUF-ACMIA) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary has non-negligible advantage in the game. For an identity-based proxy signature (IBPS), we define an ( ) of adversary and security parameter as follows:
1) A challenger runs Setup algorithm and gives the system parameters Ω to . 
5)
's output should satisfy one of the following cases till 's attack be successful.
( , , ) satisfies: ( , ) = 1 , ( , . ) ∉ , ( , . , . ) ∉ and ( , , . ) ∉ .
( ) returns 1.
( , , ) satisfies: 
and (•) . Our algorithm ℬ takes a random tuple ( , , ) , where is a random generator of . The simulator ℬ will interact with the adversary as follows:
1) A challenger runs setup algorithm to generate system parameters Ω and gives it to ℬ.
2) ℬ sets = and = 1.
3) ℬ sets lists:
← , ← , ← , ← . 4) ℬ chooses randomly , 1 ≤ ≤ and ∈ ℤ , = 1,2, ⋯ , . 5) ℬ gives system parameters Ω and lets manages Exp (k). During the execution of game, ℬ simulates 's oracles as follows:
And sets ← , ← + 1. ℬ returns ( ) to . with Hess's scheme [12] and gets ( , ) . Otherwise, ℬ simulates 's proxy-designation as follows:
• Choose ∈ , ∈ ℤ at random.
• Compute = ( , ) , .
• If has made the query ( , ) to (•), then ℬ aborts and report fail (because a collision appears • Compute = ( , ) • + , .
• If has made the query ( , ) to (•), then ℬ aborts and report fail (because a collision appears). Otherwise, ℬ sets ( , ) = .
• Let ( , , , , ) be the reply of 
Otherwise, ℬ sets ( , ) = , = 1, and returns to step 5.
During ℬ's execution, if manages an ( ) and gets return 2, collisions appear with negligible probability, as showed in [8] . So, ℬ's simulations are indistinguishable from 's oracles. Because is chosen at random, ℬ can output a forgery of proxy signature corresponding to private key = within expected time with probability / . Based on the Forking lemma [8] , ℬ can produce two valid signatures ( , , , ) and ( , , , ) such that ≠ within expected time ≤ + + + 3 + 4 . So ℬ can output . Thus we prove the theorem.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we discussed on the provable security of the Mala et al.'s ID-based proxy signature scheme [4] . We showed that this scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message and ID attacks (EUF-ACMIA), under the hardness assumption of CDHP in the random oracle model.
